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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-
103(2)0. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err when it held Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity when 
the complaint described in detail the content of the misrepresentations and material omissions, 
when they were made or omitted and who made them, thus giving defendants fair notice of the 
nature and bases or grounds of the claims and an indication of the type of litigation involved; 
but did not include the exact words used, the exact location at which the misrepresentations 
were made and who else was present? A District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss presents 
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 2010 UT 
29, If 10, 232 P.3d 999, "giving no deference to the decision of the trial court." Coroles v. Sabey, 
2003 UT 339,1f 15, 79 P.3d 974. 
Did the trial court err when it held Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires all facts supporting each fraud claim to be pled or referred to in each specific cause of 
action rather than considering the complaint as a whole? (I.e., can a court ignore portions of the 
Complaint when deciding the "particularity" of the pleading?) A District Court's grant of a 
motion to dismiss presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, Osguthorpe v. Wolf 
Mountain Resorts, 2010 UT 29, \ 10,232 P.3d 999, "giving no deference to the decision of the trial 
court." C^ i^y . J^%, 2003 UT 339, f 15,79 P.3d 974. 
Did the trial court err in dismissing Plaintiffs1 fraud-based claims for lack of particularity 
when Defendants failed to assert any argument, reason or authority for dismissing the fraud-
based claims? A District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss presents a question of law that is 
- 1 -
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reviewed for correctness, Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 2010 UT 29, f 10, 232 P.3d 999, 
"giving no deference to the decision of the trial court." Coroles v. Sabej, 2003 UT 339, ^ f 15, 79 
R3d 974. 
Did the trial court err by determining "complete relief would not be available" to 
Defendants without Ken Dolezsar ("Dolezsar"), who is deceased, as a party for reason of "the 
inability to hold him accountable," when Plaintiffs allege that he was acting as Plaintiff Leslie D. 
Mowerfs agent at the time Defendants made misrepresentations to him, which he then repeated 
to Leslie? A District Court's determination under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Seftelv. CaptialCity Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 
944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Did the trial court err by determining "complete relief would not be available" to 
Defendants without Dolezsar (deceased) as a party for reason of the "inability to hold him 
accountable" when Plaintiffs allege, in the alternative, that he was authorized by Defendants to 
repeat their misrepresentations and may have conspired with Defendants? A District Court's 
determination under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. See Seftelv. CaptialCity Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Did the trial court err in determining Dolezsar (deceased) is an indispensable party by 
reason that "Defendants will be unfairly prejudiced by any judgment issued in the absence of 
Dolezsar" based on "their inability to cross claim against him" when Plaintiffs allege that 
Dolezsar was Leslie D. Mower's agent and, in the alternative, that he was authorized by 
Defendants to repeat their misrepresentations to Leslie D. Mower? A District Court's 
determination under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will not be disturbed absent 
an abuse of discretion. See Seftelv. CaptialCity Bank, 161 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
-2-
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Did the trial court err in determining Dolezsar (deceased) is an indispensable party when 
it determined that any judgment rendered without him would be inadequate in as much as no 
cross-claims can be brought against his estate? A District Court's determination under Rule 19 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See 
Seftel v. Captial City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Did the trial court err in determining Dolezsar (deceased) is an indispensable party by 
reason that Plaintiffs will have an adequate remedy if their "fraud claims" are dismissed, 
concluding that Plaintiffs, remaining claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, 
conversion and unjust enrichment will provide an adequate remedy when Plaintiffs' remaining 
claims do not give Plaintiffs a remedy against all the Defendants and leave them no remedy for 
the fraud perpetrated against them? A District Court's determination under Rule 19 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Seftel v. Captial 
City Bank, 161 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Did the trial court err by dismissing Plaintiffs' "fraud-based claims" without leave to 
amend when the trial court failed to find that amendment would be untimely, unjustified, 
prejudicial, would cause delay, would be in bad faith or would be futile; when discovery has not 
begun, most Defendants have not filed answer and the trial court recognized that amendment 
would cure the deficiencies it found in the complaint? A District Court's ruling on a motion for 
leave to amend a complaint will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Such 
determination will not be reversed unless the decision exceeds the limits of reasonability. Coroles 
v. Sabey, 2003 UT 339, f 16, 79 P.3d 974. 
Did the trial court err in holding that Utah does not recognize causes of action for aiding 
and abetting when such causes of action are recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
-3-
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and are recognized by the majority of states? A District Court's grant of a motion to dismiss 
presents a question of law that is reviewed for correctness, Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, 
2010 UT 29, % 10,232 R3d 999, "giving no deference to the decision of the trial court." Coroles 
v. Sabey, 2003 UT 339, f 15, 79 P.3d 974. 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 9(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 15 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 19 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaintdetailing five major theaters of activity where 
fraudulent acts occurred, thirty-five primary defendants, involved in various fraudulent acts 
described in twenty-one causes of action relating to fraudulent activity, including fraud and 
intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent non-disclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent non-
disclosure, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy and Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act 
(the "UPUA"). Court Record ("Rec."), 3194-2834. 
Plaintiffs allege in the general allegations section of the Second Amended Complaint what 
misrepresentations Defendants made, when they were made and to whom they were made. 
Plaintiffs repeated or referred to many of the specific allegations of the fraud contained in the 
general allegations in their specific causes of action. Rec. 3182-3017. Defendants moved the 
trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs1 fraud claims, arguing that Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with 
-4-
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particularity.1 The trial court found that Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity because 
they did not repeat or refer to all of the specific facts contained in the general allegations again 
in the specific fraud causes of action. Rec. 6136, p. 183.2 
Defendants also moved the trial court to dismiss Plaintiffs1 fraud causes of action 
claiming Dolezsar was a necessary and indispensable party. Rec. 5288-5263. Plaintiffs allege 
that the misrepresentations at issue were made to Dolezsar, who was at all relevant times acting 
as the agent of Leslie D. Mower ("Leslie"). Plaintiffs allege, in the alternative, that the 
Defendants authorized Dolezsar to repeat their misrepresentations to Leslie as part of a 
conspiracy. The trial court found that Plaintiffs failed to allege where and when the 
misrepresentations were repeated to Leslie and dismissed the fraud claims, finding Plaintiffs 
failed to plead them with particularity. Rec. 6136, p. 183. 
The trial court also concluded that because Dolezsar was the one who repeated 
Defendants1 misrepresentations to Leslie, he is a necessary and indispensable party. Therefore, 
it dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud claims, based on Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
("URCP"). The trial court concluded that Dolezsar was "more than a simple go-between" and 
that he "occupied a pivotal representative role," based solely on Plaintiffs1 alternative pleading 
that Dolezsar was authorized to make the misrepresentations to Leslie as part of a conspiracy. 
defendants Aviano, Nemelka, Carlson and the twenty-six Defendants represented by 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker (the "Simpson Defendants") all filed motions to dismiss the fraud 
claims. However, the Simpson Defendants1 argument encompassed the argument of the other 
defendants. Therefore, Plaintiffs will focus on the Simpson Defendants' arguments, as the trial 
court did. 
2The Second Amended Complaint is voluminous, totaling 361 pages as pled. The length 
would have likely doubled if the allegations were repeated in each of the specific causes, rather 
than including them once in the general allegations. 
-5-
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Rec. 5593. 
The trial court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary 
duty and aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure, finding that Utah does not recognize 
such causes of action. Rec. 5604. Further, the trial court, without: applying any of the required 
factors or giving an explanation, also dismissed Plaintiffs, fraud claims without leave to amend. 
Rec. 6136, p. 186. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint m. this matter on October 20,2009. Rec. 461. On November 
27,2009, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint^ adding two causes of action. Rec. 2143. After 
hearing argument on various motions to dismiss, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud claims, 
but granted Plaintiffs leave to amend. Rec. 2608-2606. On March 5,2010, Plaintiffs filed their 
Second Amended Complaint^ detailing five major theaters of activity where fraudulent acts occurred, 
thirty-five primary defendants, involving various fraudulent acts described in twenty-one causes 
of action relating to the fraudulent activity, including fraud and intentional misrepresentation, 
fraudulent non-disclosure, negligent misrepresentations, conspiracy and Utah's Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity Act. Rec. 3194-2834. 
On March 15, 2010, Defendant Chad Carlson filed a motion to dismiss the Second 
Amended Complaint\ alleging that Plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with particularity. Rec. 5071-
5053. On March 19, 2010, Defendant Michael Aviano filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that 
five of Plaintiffs1 causes of action should be dismissed for failing to plead fraud with 
particularity. Rec. 5128-5107. On April 16,2010, Defendant David Nemelka filed a motion to 
dismiss, claiming all of Plaintiffs' fraud based causes of action in relation to The Preserve at 
-6-
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Mapeleton development should be dismissed.3 Rec. 5310-5300. On April 13, 2010, the 
Simpson Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that fifteen of Plaintiffs1 causes of action 
should be dismissed for failing to plead fraud with particularity, that Plaintiffs, claims for aiding 
and abetting should be dismissed based on Rule 12(b)(6) URCP, and that all of Plaintiffs1 fraud 
based claims should be dismissed for failure to join an indispensable party. Rec. 5288-5263. 
The various motions to dismiss were argued before Fourth District Court Judge Samuel 
D. McVey on May 13, 2010. Ruling from the bench, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' "fraud 
based claims," finding Plaintiffs failed to plead them with particularity. Rec. 6136, p. 182. On 
June 7,2010, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' fraud claims, finding Dolezsar (deceased) 
is a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19(b) URCP. Rec. 5593-5592. On June 22, 
2010, the trial court executed a written order dismissing fourteen of Plaintiffs1 causes of actions 
in their entirety and five of Plaintiffs1 causes of action "to the extent those claims are based on 
allegations of fraud" without leave to amend. Rec. 5603. Plaintiffs filed petitions for permission 
to file interlocutory appeals regarding both orders. Rec. 5711 and 5715. Both petitions were 
granted. Rec. 5959. 
STATEMENT O F FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint details five major theaters of activity where 
fraudulent acts occurred, thirty-five primary defendants, involved in various fraudulent acts 
described in twenty-one causes of action including: fraud and intentional misrepresentation, 
fraudulent non-disclosure, aiding and abetting fraudulent non-disclosure, negligent 
3Nemelka was not named as a defendant in two of the causes of action, fraud and 
intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation in relation to The Preserve 
development, which he moved the trial court to dismiss. 
-7-
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misrepresentation, conversion, conspiracy and claims under UPUA, occurring over a five year 
period. Rec. 3194-2834. 
2. Throughout the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar was at 
all times acting as her agent, was Lesliefs husband and was in charge of her business affairs. Rec. 
3177, f 8; 3126, \ 209; 3016, If 542; 3001, If 601; 2978, % 718, and 2945, % 864. 
3. Dolezsar was murdered on November 15, 2007. Rec. 3056, ]f 400. 
Hawaii Condominium Development 
4. Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint contains causes of action in relation to a 
Hawaii condominium development for fraud and intentional misrepresentation, breach of 
fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent non-disclosure, aiding and 
abetting fraudulent non-disclosure, negligent misrepresentation, conversion, unjust enrichment, 
conspiracy and UPUA, along with various contract based causes of action. Rec. 3017-2978. 
5. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 causes of action for fraud and intentional 
misrepresentation and fraudulent non-disclosure for lack of particularity and for failure to join 
an indispensable party. Rec. 5606-5600. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 causes of action 
for conspiracy and UPUA to the extent they were based on allegations of fraud. Id. The trial 
court also dismissed Plaintiffs' causes of action for aiding and abetting, finding Utah courts do 
not recognize causes of action for aiding and abetting. Id. 
6. Plaintiffs allege in detail the facts underlying and supporting their fraud claims in 
relation to the Hawaii Condominium development and describing the scheme that Michael 
Thompson had initiated and in which Thompson, David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Todd 
Dorny and Brandon Dente (the "Hawaii Defendants") participated. Rec. 3182-3128. 
7. Plaintiffs allege the formation of the scheme andits participants. Rec. 3180-3179, 
- 8 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1PH 73,74 and 75. 
8. David Simpson, on behalf of the Hawaii Defendants, approached Dolezsar, 
seeking Leslie's investment in the Hawaii Condominium development Rec. 3177, ^  82. 
9. On March 1, 2005, David Simpson made misrepresentations to Dolezsar to 
induce Leslie to invest her funds. Rec. 3177-3176, fflj 82 and 83. 
10. Plaintiffs specifically identify who made the misrepresentations, when the 
misrepresentations were made and the misrepresentations1 content. Rec. 3177-3176, ^| 81-83; 
3174-3173, inf 85-86; and 3016-3015, ffl[ 542- 543 and % 545. 
11. Plaintiffs allege that the Hawaii Defendants made the misrepresentations to 
Dolezsar, knowing that he was acting as Leslie's agent, that he was Leslie's husband and that he 
was managing Leslie's affairs. Rec. 3017-3016, ffl| 541-42. 
12. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar repeated the misrepresentations to Leslie. Rec. 
3016,1J543. 
13. Plaintiffs allege, in the alternative, that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, 
knowing Dolezsar was Leslie's agent and was managing her business affairs, authorized Dolezsar 
to repeat the misrepresentations to Leslie. Rec. 3016, ffij 542-543. 
14. Plaintiffs allege that the Hawaii Defendants knowingly, intentionally and 
deceitfully failed to disclose relevant, material facts to Dolezsar and Leslie, that they knew the 
true facts, had a duty to disclose them and failed to do so. Rec. 3005-3004, fflf 580-583. 
15. Although Defendants failed to provide any argument, reason or authority as to 
why Plaintiffs' fraud allegations were not pled with particularity, the trial court dismissed 
Plaintiffs' fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-disclosure claims. It also 
dismissed Plaintiffs' conspiracy and UPUA claims to the extent they are based on claims of 
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fraud. Rec. 5605-5603. 
16. Despite Plaintiffs1 detailed allegations regarding the representations made to 
Dolezsar repeated to Leslie, and despite the fact that Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar was acting 
as Leslie's agent, the trial court stated, "Plaintiff [Leslie] in this case ... was directly privy to what 
was said to her. She has all that information and knowledge. ... I mean, she knows where that 
occurred, what words were used, who else was present, all of those types of things." Rec. 6136, 
p. 183. 
17. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud-based claims, finding Plaintiffs did not 
repeat all the facts supporting Plaintiffs1 fraud claims within the causes of action, even though 
they were included in the general allegations section of the Second A.mended Complaint. The trial 
court stated, "there are circumstances where there were not references to earlier facts that were 
pleaded ... those should be identified and included in the cause of action." However, the trial 
court failed to specify any example of those circumstances. Rec. 6136, p. 183. 
18. The trial court concluded that Dolezsar was "more than a simple go-between," 
and that he "occupied a pivotal representative role in the alleged fraud." The trial court found: 
(1) Dolezsar was a major actor; (2) the Defendants would be unfairly prejudiced because they 
cannot cross claim against Dolezsar; (3) any judgment rendered without Dolezsar would be 
inadequate because no cross claims can be brought against Dolezsar or his estate; and (4) 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims would provide them an adequate remedy. Rec. 5595-5591. 
Therefore, the trial court found Dolezsar (deceased) to be an indispensable party and dismissed 
Plaintiffs' "fraud claims" based on Rule 19 URCP. Rec. 5593-5592. 
The Preserve at Mapleton Development Scheme 
19. Plaintiffs' causes of action for fraud and intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent 
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non-disclosure, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy and UPUA in relation to The Preserve 
at Mapleton development consists of several inter-related frauds: 
(a) Fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-
disclosure in relation to the purchase of approximately 30.7 acres of real property 
known as the "Whiting Property11 and the representations David Simpson and 
Nathan Simpson made to convince Leslie to invest $4,300,000.00 to fund the 
purchase of the Whiting Property; 
(b) Fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-
disclosure in relation to David Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's efforts to 
convince Leslie to invest an additional $6,800,000.00 in The Preserve at Mapleton 
development; 
(c) Fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-
disclosure in relation to The Preserve at Mapleton development project regarding 
a document that purported to accurately summarize Leslie's funds that had been 
taken and used for The Preserve development project; 
(d) Fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-
disclosure, in relation to David Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's application for 
a loan from MagnetBank and later misrepresentations to MagnetBank; and, 
(e) Fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-
disclosure in relation the sale by David Simpson and the purchase by Leslie of 
30.7 acres of real property located in Springville, Utah, as additional incentive for 
her to lend funds to David Simpson and Nathan Simpson. 
Rec. 3127-3041. 
20. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, knowing that Dolezsar 
was acting as Leslie's agent, that he was managing Leslie's business affairs and that he had access 
to Leslie's funds, persuaded him that The Preserve at Mapleton development was a "blue chip 
investment" opportunity. Rec. 3124, ]f 216. 
21. Plaintiffs allege the specific facts and details underlying and supporting their fraud 
claims in relation to The Preserve at Mapleton development. Rec. 3127-3041. 
The Preserve - Whiting Property Fraud 
22. . Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson concocted a scheme 
to artificially raise the value of 170 acres they had previously purchased for The Preserve at 
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Mapleton development Rec. 3116, f 247; 3313-3108,ffl[ 256-265; 3108-3107, ffll 269-270; and 
2978-2977, tlf 719-720. In an attempt to inflate the value of the total acreage for the purposes 
of an appraisal, they intended to use Leslie's funds to purchase 30.7 acres next to the 170 acres 
at a higher cost per acre than they paid for the 170 acres. Id. 
23. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, as part of their scheme, 
intended to use, and did use, Leslie's funds to purchase 30.7 acres immediately next to the 170 
acres at a much higher per acre cost to fool appraisers and lenders into believing that the 170 
acres were worth the same higher per acre value as the 30.7 acres. Rec. 3116,1247; 3107, \ 270; 
and 2978-2977, fflf 719-720. 
24. Plaintiffs allege that in April 2006, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson made 
misrepresentations to Dolezsar, who was acting as Leslie's agent, to induce Leslie to provide her 
funds to purchase the 30.7 acres. Plaintiffs allege the specific misrepresentations made by the 
Simpsons. Rec. 3113-3112, % 256; 3110, % 259; and 2977,1f1f 720-721. 
25. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson knew that Dolezsar was 
acting as Leslie's agent when they made misrepresentations to him. Rec. at 3113-3112, f 256. 
26. Plaintiffs allege the misrepresentations were false and why they were false. Rec. 
2977-2976, % 723. 
27. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar was not aware that the misrepresentations were false 
and, that he was acting as Leslie's agent. Plaintiffs allege, only in the alternative, that Dolezsar 
was part of a conspiracy and was acting on David Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's 
authorization, direction and instruction when he repeated the misrepresentations to Leslie. Rec. 
3110,1f1f 258-259; and 2977, f 721. 
28. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson intentionally withheld 
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relevant, material facts. Rec. 3112-3110, % 257; 2976, f 724; and 2951, ffl[ 833-837. 
29. Plaintiffs allege the misrepresentations were statements of presently existing fact 
and intent, that Defendants intentionally withheld the relevant, material facts, that they knew the 
misrepresentations were false, they made them for the purpose of inducing Leslie to provide 
funds and that Leslie provided the funds and was harmed thereby. Rec. 2977-2975, fflf 722-729. 
30. Defendants failed to make any argument, reason or authority as to why Plaintiffs1 
allegations failed to meet the Rule 9(b) URCP particularity requirement. Rec. 5288-5268. 
31. Despite Defendants1 failure to provide any argument, reason or authority as to 
why Plaintiffs' fraud allegations in regard to the Whiting Property did not meet the particularity 
requirement, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 "fraud-based claims" concluding that Plaintiffs 
failed to plead the facts with the required particularity. Rec. 5288-5268 and 5605-5603. 
$6,800,000.00 Loan 
32. Plaintiffs allege at or near the end of November or the beginning of December 
2006, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson needed $6,800,000.00 to save The Preserve at 
Mapleton development. Rec. 3092-3091, % 314. 
33. Plaintiffs allege that at the end of November or beginning of December 2006, 
David Simpson and Nathan Simpson made misrepresentations to Dolezsar, who was acting as 
Leslie's agent, to induce her to lend funds for The Preserve at Mapleton development. Plaintiffs 
allege the specific misrepresentations, who made them and when they were made. Rec. 3092-
3086,1f|f 314-317; 2975, f 731; 2974, If 734; and 2973, % 739. 
34. Plaintiffs allege that Dolezsar, on the authorization and instruction of David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson or, in the alternative, as part of a conspiracy, repeated 
misrepresentations to Leslie to induce her to lend $6,800,000.00 for The Preserve at Mapleton 
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development Rec. 3092-3091,1f 314; and 2975,1f 731. 
35. Plaintiffs allege the representations were false and why they were false. Rec. 2974, 
Tlf 733 and 736; and 2973, If 741. 
36. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson knowingly and 
intentionally withheld relevant, material facts from Dolezsar and Leslie and that they had a duty 
to disclose the relevant, material facts. Rec. 3089- 3086, ]f 317; 2976, % 724; 2951, If 838; and 
2949, % 848. 
37. Plaintiffs allege the representations were statements of presently existing fact and 
intent, that Defendants intentionally withheld relevant, material facts, that Defendants knew the 
representations were false, they were made for the purpose of inducing Leslie to provide funds 
and that Leslie provided the funds and was harmed thereby. Rec. 2975, f^ 732; 2974, f^ 735, 
2973, f 740, 2972, fflj 743-745. 
38. As an inducement for Leslie to make a $6,800,000.00 loan, David Simpson and 
Nathan Simpson, on behalf of The Preserve at Mapleton Development Company, LLC, 
executed a promissory note and trust deed in favor of Leslie's entity, LD III, LLC, as security 
for the loan. Rec. 3085-3084,1323. 
39. As a further inducement for Leslie to make the $6,800,000.00 loan, David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson signed an additional promissory note to Leslie in the amount of 
$6,800,000.00 as prepaid consideration. Rec. 3090, % 316(a); 3084, % 325. 
40. Defendants did not provide any argument, reason or authority as to why the fraud 
allegations in relation to the $6,800,000.00 loan do not meet the Rule 9(b) URCP particularity 
standard. Rec. 5288-5268. 
41. Despite Defendants' failure to provide any argument, reason or authority as to 
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why Plaintiffs1 fraud allegations in regard to the $6,800,000.00 loan did not meet the particularity 
requirement, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs1 "fraud-based claims" concluding that 
Plaintiffs failed to plead the facts with particularity. Rec. 5605-5603. 
Summary Document 
42. David Simpson, Nathan Simpson, Dolezsar and Leslie all signed a document 
which summarized the various transfers of Leslie's funds for The Preserve at Mapleton 
development. Rec. 3086-3085, Tj 319. 
43. Plaintiffs allege the summary document fails to account for at least four transfers 
of Leslie's funds, that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson represented the document accurately 
summarized all of Leslie's funds that had been used for The Preserve at Mapleton development, 
that the document was false and that the Simpsons had a duty to disclose the true facts to Leslie 
but failed to do so. Rec. 3086-3085,1f 319; 2971, ffif 747-749; and 2939-2938, ffl| 891-894. 
44. Plaintiffs allege the misrepresentations were false and why they were false. Rec. 
297l,1f749. 
45. Plaintiffs allege the misrepresentations were statements of presendy existing fact 
and intent, that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson intentionally withheld relevant material 
facts, that Defendants knew the representations were false, that they were made for the purpose 
of inducing Leslie to provide funds and that Leslie provided the funds and was harmed thereby. 
Rec. 2971, ffif 748-753. 
46. Once again, Defendants failed to provide any argument, reason or authority as to 
why the fraud allegations in relation to the summary document loan do not meet the Rule 9(b) 
URCP particularity requirement. Rec. 5288-5268. 
47. Despite Defendants' failure to provide any argument, reason or authority as to 
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why Plaintiffs1 fraud allegations in regard to the summary document did not meet the 
particularity requirement, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' "fraud-based claims" 
concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plead the facts with particularity. Rec. 5605-5603. 
MagnetBank 
48. Plaintiffs allege David Simpson and Nathan Simpson needed to obtain a new loan 
for The Preserve at Mapleton development. Rec. 3100-3099,^ 296. They needed a high value 
appraisal to obtain a loan in a sufficient amount to refinance their existing high interest loan. 
Rec. 3099, ^ f 297. As part of the scheme to artificially raise values for an appraisal, the Simpsons 
arranged for fourteen offers to made by four parties on lots within a one week period. Rec. 
3098-3096, fflj 300-304. Plaintiffs allege the offers were not real but were intended to deceive 
appraisers and lenders. Rec. 3099, f 297; 3098-3096,1fl[ 300-304; 3081,% 335; 3079, f 340; and 
2067-2966, ffl[ 783-784. 
49. Plaintiffs allege that Nathan Simpson provided the offers to an appraiser and that 
the offers were used by the appraiser in arriving at a value for the real property. Rec. 3098-3096, 
HTf 300-303; 3081,1f 335; 3079, f 340; and 2967-2966, fflf 783-784. 
50. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson failed to inform the 
appraiser that as part of gaining approvals for The Preserve at Mapleton development, they were 
obligated to furnish 10 acres to the city of Mapleton for a cemetery. Rec. 3079, % 341; and 2966, 
1785. 
51. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson failed to inform the 
appraiser that The Preserve at Mapleton development property did not include 3.85 acres that 
were necessary for the construction of a debris basin, without which the property could not be 
developed. Rec. 3080-3079, If 339; and 2966, % 786. 
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52. Plaintiffs allege David Simpson and Nathan Simpson intentionally never recorded 
the trust deed securing LD Ill's loan for $6,800,000.00 so that MagnetBank would be unaware 
of the loan. Rec. 3085-3084, ffi[ 323-324; and 2974-2973, fflf 737-738. 
53. Plaintiffs allege that in return for Michael Aviano's agreement to lend David 
Simpson $2,000,000.00 personally, that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson sold a lot to 
Aviano for $575,000.00 that had a list price of $1,360,000.00 and the amount due to 
MagnetBank to release its security interest in the lot was $1,020,000.00. Rec. 3055-3053, fflf 404-
413; and 2965-2963, fflj 794-810. 
54. The Aviano closing documents show the purchase price was $900,000.00, the 
purchase price was reported to MagnetBank as $900,000.00 and Michael Aviano affirmed to a 
deputy county assessor that the purchase price $900,000.00. Rec. 3054, f 408; 3054-3053, U 413; 
and 2964,1f 798. 
55. Plaintiffs allege that had MagnetBank known of the misrepresentations it would 
not have allowed the sale to occur and would have taken steps to secure its collateral. Rec. 2963, 
fflf 806-810. Further, Plaintiffs allege that if MagnetBank had known, it would have declared the 
loan due. Rec. 2963, ^ 808. 
56. Plaintiffs allege David Simpson and Nathan Simpson furnished MagnetBank false 
personal financial statements which overstated their assets and understated their liabilities. Rec. 
3075-3072, fflf 352-356; 2969, ffi[ 767-768; and 2968, f 773. 
57. Based on the false information provided by David Simpson and Nathan Simpson, 
MagnetBank provided a $12,713,200.00 loan to them for The Preserve at Mapleton 
development. Rec. 3073-3069, ffif 356-359, 2963, fflf 806-810. Because the Simpsons failed to 
record LD Ill's trust deed and because Leslie knew that the Simpsons were about to default on 
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th MagnetBank loan, her entity, Navona, L.C., purchased the MagnetBank loan. Rec. 3053-
3052, % 416. 
58. Defendants argued that to satisfy Rule 9(b) URCP, Plaintiffs must allege which 
particular assets were over-valued, by how much each asset was over-valued and why each asset 
was improperly included. Rec. 5276. They also argued that Plaintiffs had to allege which 
liabilities were understated or otherwise not included. Id 
59. The trial court granted Defendants1 motion to dismiss for the "reasons set forth 
in the memoranda supporting the Simpson Motion," and therefore presumably agreed that 
Plaintiffs had to allege the particulars of each asset and liability. Rec. 5605. 
60. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson failed to include their 
personal obligation to pay $6,800,000.00 to Leslie in the financial statements furnished to 
MagnetBank. Rec. 2968, f 774. 
61. Dolezsar was not involved in the misrepresentations made to MagnetBank or in 
the false offers. Rec. 2969-2962. ,,,, 
62. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs* fraud claims for failure to join Dolezsar, 
yet Dolezsar had no involvement with the misrepresentations made to MagnetBank. Rec. 2969-
2962; and 5592. 
Prime Commercial Property 
63. Plaintiffs allege that as part of David Simpson's and Nathan Simpson's scheme 
to induce Leslie to lend her funds for The Preserve at Mapleton development, they offered to 
sell her 30.76 acres of real property located in Springville, Utah which they represented was 
worth $3,300,000.00 for only $1,500,000.00 if she would lend them $6,800,000.00. Rec. 3048-
3046, m| 434-435; 2909, % 1008. 
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64. Plaintiffs allege that in December 2006, as an inducement for Leslie to lend 
$6,800,000.00, David Simpson and Nathan Simpson represented to Dolezsar that a 30.76 acre 
parcel of real property owned by one of David Simpson's entities was prime commercial 
property where Leslie could build an office building, warehouse and production facilities. Rec. 
3048-3047,1f 433-434; and 3013,1f 757. 
65. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson made specific 
misrepresentations to Dolezsar, knowing that he was acting as Leslie's agent. Plaintiffs allege 
what misrepresentations were made, who made them and when they were made. Rec. 3048-
3047, U 434; and 2908, If 1014. 
66. Plaintiffs allege only in the alternative that Dolezsar conspired with David 
Simpson and Nathan Simpson. Rec. 3047-3046, ^ 435. Even if Dolezsar conspired with the 
Simpsons, Plaintiffs allege that the Simpsons authorized him to make the representations to 
Leslie. Rec. 3048-3047, 1f 434. 
67. Plaintiffs allege David Simpson and Nathan Simpson knew the representations 
were false when they made them. Rec. 2969, If 761. 
68. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson had a duty to disclose 
relevant, material facts but failed to do so, and they specify what those facts are. Rec. 3047-
3046, f 435; and 2899-298, ffif 1075-1079. 
69. Once again, Defendants failed to provide any argument, reason or authority to 
the trial court as to why the fraud allegations in relation to prime commercial property do not 
meet the Rule 9(b) URCP particularity requirement. Rec. 5288-5268. 
70. Despite Defendants1 failure to provide any argument, reason or authority as to 
why Plaintiffs1 fraud allegations in regard to the prime commercial property do not meet the 
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particularity requirement, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs1 "fraud-based claims," 
concluding that Plaintiffs failed to plead the facts with particularity. Rec. 5605-5603. 
Double T Ranch Water Purchase 
71. Defendants claimed that Plaintiffs failed to plead their cause of action for 
fraudulent non-disclosure in relation to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase with particularity 
— arguing that Plaintiffs fail "to allege how such non-disclosures resulted in any damage." Rec. 
5275. 
72. Plaintiffs allege how David Simpson took LD Ill's funds, purchased the water 
shares, and then kept them for himself. Rec. 3032-303, If 489-495; and 3028, f 504. Further, 
Plaintiffs allege that Simpson sold some of the water shares but kept the funds for himself. Rec. 
3028, [^ 505. Plaintiffs also allege that "as a direct and proximate result of David Simpson's 
failures to disclose the relevant facts of which he had knowledge, Leslie and LD III were 
damaged in the amount of at least $300,125.00." Rec. 2882, f 1182. 
73. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 cause of action, concluding that Plaintiffs 
failed to adequately plead damages and therefore failed to satisfy Rule 9(b) URCP. Rec. 5605-
5603. 
Presidio Land and Water 
74. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud and intentional misrepresentation and 
their fraudulent non-disclosure causes of action in relation to the Presidio Land and Water deal 
in their entirety and dismissed Plaintiffs1 conspiracy cause of action, in relation to the Presidio 
Land and Water deal to the extent it is based on allegations of fraud. Rec. 5605-5603. 
75. Defendants argued that Plaintiffs failed to allege what specific actions were taken 
in reliance on the misrepresentations and what particular damages were caused by each discrete 
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action. Rec. 5288-5268. 
76. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson told Leslie's son, who 
was then managing her business affairs, that The Preserve needed at least $281,693.59 to pay due 
and past due bills and that a large portion of that amount represented funds needed to pay The 
Preserve's pro rata share of the cost of a water tank for the City of Mapleton. Rec. 2895, f 1094. 
Leslie provided the funds. Rec. 3035, ^ f 479. However, the Simpsons paid themselves rather 
than using the funds for the water tank costs. Id. 
11. Plaintiffs allege that on April 3,2008, Leslie furnished another $300,000.00 to be 
used to fully satisfy The Preserve's share of the water tank cost. Rec. 3035-3034, f^ 480. From 
those funds, Nathan Simpson paid $200,384.20 to Maple Mountain Water, the entity handling 
the payment of the water tank costs. Id. Nathan Simpson, manager of Maple Mountain Water, 
then directed the bookkeeper to allocated $151,037.28 of the $200,384.20 as payment for 
another party's share of the water tank cost, a party to whom David Simpson owed money. Id. 
78. Plaintiffs allege that David Simpson and Nathan Simpson used funds received 
from Leslie to pay themselves, clearly setting forth that Leslie had furnished funds. Rec. at 2894, 
111101. 
79. Defendants never offered any argument, reason or authority regarding why all of 
Plaintiffs' conspiracy and fraudulent non-disclosure allegations did not comply with Rule 9(b) 
URCP. Rec. 5288-5268. 
80. Further, Dolezsar was not involved with the misrepresentations in relation to the 
Presidio Land and Water scheme, yet the trial court dismissed "all of Plaintiffs' fraud claims" 
because of the failure to join Dolezsar as a party. Rec. at 3041-3032; 5605-5603. 
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Dismissal Without Leave to Amend 
81. Plaintiffs filed an original Complaint, then, before serving it, filed a First Amended 
Complaint. Rec. 461 and 2143. 
82. After several motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint Rec. 
3194-2834. 
83. The trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs' "fraud-based claims" in the Second 
Amended Complaintwithout leave to amend. Rec. 6136, p. 182. 
Aiding and Abetting Causes of Action 
84. Plaintiffs allege two causes of action for aiding and abetting fraudulent non-
disclosure and two causes of action for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duties. Rec. 
3007-3006; 3003-3002; 2953-2952; and 2947-2945. 
85. The trial court dismissed the aiding and abetting claims, finding that Utah courts 
do not recognize causes of action for aiding and abetting. Rec. 5604. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Rule 9(b) URCP requires that fraud be alleged with particularity. In the Second Amended 
Complaint1 s general allegations section, Plaintiffs allege the misrepresentations made, who made 
them and when they were made. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs1 causes of action for 
fraud and intentional misrepresentation and fraudulent non-disclosure in their entirety; and 
Plaintiffs1 conspiracy and UPUA claims to die extent they are based on fraud. Defendants 
offered argument, reasons and authority as to why only three of Plaintiffs1 causes of action did 
not meet the Rule 9(b) URCP particularity requirement. 
However, relying on Defendants' memoranda, the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs1 
fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims and fraudulent non-disclosure claims in their 
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entirety and also dismissed Plaintiffs1 conspiracy and UPUA claims to the extent they are based 
on fraud. The trial court concluded that Plaintiffs1 fraud causes of action failed to meet the Rule 
9(b) URCP particularity requirements, finding Plaintiffs did not refer to, include, or repeat all 
of the facts underlying the fraud claims pled within the Second Amended Complaint's general 
allegations section again in the specific causes of action. The trial court failed to consider the 
Second Amended Complaint as a whole, and instead focused only on what was contained in the 
individual causes of action. Further, the trial court ignored that Plaintiffs1 included and referred 
to the important facts in the specific causes of action. 
The trial court ignored established agency principles by focusing on the wrong events. 
It focused on Dolezsarfs repetitions of Defendants1 misrepresentations to Leslie, rather than 
focusing on Defendants' misrepresentations to Dolezsar, Leslie's agent. Plaintiffs allege 
Dolezsar was always acting as Leslie's agent or, in the alternative, that he was authorized by the 
Defendants to make the misrepresentations to Leslie. Utah law is clear that when a 
representation is made to an agent, it is the same as having been made to the principal. 
Therefore Plaintiffs did not need to allege the specifics of when and where Dolezsar repeated 
the misrepresentations to Leslie. Alleging Defendants' misrepresentations to Dolezsar was 
enough. 
The trial court also found that because Dolezsar was the person who repeated the 
misrepresentations to Leslie, even though Plaintiffs allege he was acting as Leslie's agent, that 
Dolezsar was a necessary and indispensable party who could not be joined. The trial court, 
relying on Turville v. ]&] Properties, L.C, 2006 UT App 305, 145 P.3d 1146, concluded that 
Dolezsar was necessary and indispensable because he was the one who repeated the 
misrepresentations to Leslie and because Defendants cannot now bring a cross-claim against 
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Dolezsar. The trial court misapplied the Turville holding in finding that Dolezsar occupied a 
"pivotal representative role" in the fraud. Further, the inability to bring a cross-claim against a 
co-conspirator or a joint-tortfeasor is not grounds for finding a party is indispensable under Rule 
19(b) URCP. The trial court misapplied Rule 19(b) URCP. 
Plaintiffs do not allege that Dolezsar repeated all of the alleged misrepresentations to 
Leslie, or that he was involved in all the misrepresentations. Yet the trial court dismissed allot 
Plaintiffs1 fraud claims, finding Dolezsar was necessary and indispensable. 
The trial court further dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud claims without leave to amend. Rule 
15 URCP requires leave to amend be liberally granted. By dismissing Plaintiffs1 fraud claims 
without leave to amend, the trial court abused its discretion. It failed to apply the appropriate 
factors. Had it done so, it would have had to conclude that Plaintiffs should be allowed to 
amend. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud claims for procedural deficiencies and stated 
that Plaintiffs could cure the defects by amendment. It is early in this matter, there would be no 
delay or prejudice, yet the trial court dismissed the claims without leave to amend. 
Lastly, the trial court found Utah does not recognize causes of action for aiding and 
abetting and dismissed Plaintiffs causes of action for aiding and abetting fraudulent non-
disclosure and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
recognizes such causes of action, as do the majority of states. The Federal District Court for the 
District of Utah held Utah State courts recognize such causes of action. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFFS P L E D FRAUD WITH T H E REQUISITE PARTICULARITY 
Rule 9(b) URCP states, "[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting the fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, 
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and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." "In reviewing a dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we accept the plaintiffs description 
of facts alleged in the complaint to be true ...." Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 
UT 29, % 10, 232 P.3d 999 (internal citations omitted). When considering a motion to dismiss, 
a trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff See 
Mackey v. Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, \ 2, 996 P.2d 1081. 
In alleging fraud, a party must set forth the facts with "sufficient particularity to show 
what facts are claimed to constitute the charges." Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 
14, f 16,70 P.3d 35. In addressing whether fraud had been adequately pled, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated "our liberalized rules of pleading are designed to afford parties the privilege of 
presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, subject only to 
the requirement that their adversary have fair notice of the nature and the basis or grounds of 
the claim and general indication of the type of litigation involved." Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 
% 14, 28 P.3d 1271. In holding that Hill pled fraud with particularity, the court stated, "Hill 
alleges specific facts ... regarding her attempt to purchase a piece of real property with the help 
of several defendants in this action, the manner in which the transaction was initiated, and the 
unfolding of events related to her attempt to secure ownership of the property." Id. at f^ 14. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that to plead fraud with particularity means that a party's 
allegations must contain the "substance of the acts constituting the alleged wrong." Williams v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 966,972 (Utah 1982). A plaintiff who alleges the time of the alleged 
fraud, the persons involved and the facts and transactions underlying the fraud satisfies the 
requirements of Rule 9(b) URCP. SeeDahlv. Gardner, 583 F.Supp. 1262,1267 (D. Utah 1984). 
"[CJourts should be sensitive to the fact that application of the Rule [Rule 9(b)] prior to 
-25-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
discovery may permit sophisticated defrauders to successfully conceal the details of their fraud." 
Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp. 964 F.2d 272, 284 (3rd Or. 1992). 
Here, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud-based claims prior to any discovery, 
concluding Plaintiffs did not specify the exact location at which the misrepresentations were 
made, exactly when the misrepresentations were made, exactly what words were used and who 
else may have been present. The trial court required far more particularity than Rule 9(b) URCP 
requires. The trial court stated, "I mean she [Leslie] knows where that should have occurred, 
when it would have occurred, what words were used, who else was present...." Rec. 6136, p. 
183. Here, as in Hill, Plaintiffs allege specific facts regarding the various misrepresentations — 
when the misrepresentations were made, who made them, the content of the misrepresentations, 
the manner in which the misrepresentations and transactions were initiated and the unfolding 
of events related to the fraud. See e.g. Rec. 3177-3174; 3113-3110; 3092-3086; 3073-3069; 3048-
3046; 3033-3032; 3017-3014; 3011; 3005-3004; 2994; 2992; 2990; 2982; 2980; 2978-2970; 2968-
2965; 2962; 2950-2948; 2925-2911; 2909-2906. Therefore, like the plaintiff in Hill, Plaintiffs 
allege fraud with sufficient particularity. 
In Schwart^v. Celestial Seasonings, 124 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997), a securities fraud case, the 
court found that the complaint met the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b), stating: 
11
 [t] he complaint identifies each of the defendants and describes their involvement 
with, or responsibility for, the alleged fraud. It identifies, describes, paraphrases 
and quotes allegedly fraudulent statements and/or omissions found in the IPO 
and SPO prospectuses .... The Complaint also alleges facts which the identified 
statements failed to disclose or misrepresent, and it explains how the statements 
accomplished the fraudulent scheme." 
Id. at 1250-51. The Schwart^ court went on to say n[t]he purpose of Rule 9(b) is to afford 
defendant fair notice of plaintiff s claims and the factual ground upon which they are based." 
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Id. at 1252 (citations omitted). The Schwart^ court certainly did not require that a plaintiff quote 
the exact words used. 
The Schwart^ court further stated: 
Rule 9(b) does not require that a complaint set forth detailed evidentiary matters 
as to why particular defendants are responsible for particular statements, or that 
the allegations be factually or legally valid. Instead, Rule 9 requires that the 
pleadings give notice to the defendants of the fraudulent statements for which 
they are alleged to be responsible. The complaint adequately identified the 
defendants charged with having made the allegedly fraudulent statements. There 
can be no doubt that the complaint gives each defendant notice of what he is 
charged with. No more is required by Rule 9(b). 
Id. at 1253. 
Here, Plaintiffs clearly and specifically identify who made the fraudulent statements, 
when they were made, and the fraudulent statements they are alleged to have made. Rec. 3177-
3174; 3113-3110; 3092-3086; 3073-3069; 3048-3046; 3033-3032; 3017-3014; 3011; 3005-3004; 
2994; 2992; 2990; 2982; 2980; 2978-2970; 2968-2965; 2962; 2950-2948; 2925-2911; 2909-2906. 
The Second Amended Complaintclearly gives each defendant "notice of what he is charged with.11 
In Seattle-First National Bank v. Carlstedt, 800 F.2d 1008,1011 (10th Or. 1986), the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that Rule 9(b) only: 
requires identification of the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. That 
requirement means that individual plaintiffs should identify particular defendants 
with whom they dealt directly, and from whom they purchased stock; that 
individual plaintiffs should designate the occasions on which affirmative 
statements were allegedly made to them and by whom; and that individual 
plaintiffs should designate what affirmative misstatements or half truths were 
directed to them and how. 
Id. at 1011. 
In proving the elements of fraud, a Plaintiff is not required to prove where 
misrepresentations were made, thus there was no basis for dismissing for failing to do so. There 
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is no requirement that a plaintiff plead the exact words used in making a misrepresentation. 
Plaintiffs allege which particular defendants made the misrepresentations, when the 
misrepresentations were made, and what misrepresentations were made. Such is sufficient to 
satisfy Rule 9(b) URCP. 
Regarding Plaintiffs1 claims for fraudulent non-disclosure, the trial court required that 
Plaintiffs allege who made omissions, when they made omissions, where they made omissions 
and the content of the omissions. To allege a cause of action for fraudulent non-disclosure, a 
plaintiff must allege only "(1) that the non-disclosed information is material, (2) that the 
nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose and (3) that there is a legal 
duty to communicate." Ya^dv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, % 10,143 P.3d 283. Plaintiffs 
adequately allege those elements. To go beyond that and prove a negative is never required for 
fraud arising from an omission. 
The trial court concluded Plaintiffs' failed to allege all of their fraudulent non-disclosure 
causes of action with particularity. The trial court held that to allege a cause of action for 
fraudulent non-disclosure, Plaintiffs must specifically explain how they relied on Defendants1 
fraudulent non-disclosures. It partly based its dismissal of Plaintiffs1 fraudulent non-disclosure 
cause of action in relation to the Double T. Ranch Water Purchase on its conclusion that 
Plaintiffs did not allege how they relied on the misrepresentations. Rec. 6136, p. 183. However, 
as explained in Ya%d, reliance is not a required element of pleading fraudulent non-disclosure. 
Plaintiffs clearly allege the non-disclosed facts are material, the information was known 
to Defendants and they had a legal duty to communicate the information. Plaintiffs identified 
the facts not disclosed, the identity of the Defendants who intentionally withheld the facts and 
when the Defendants intentionally withheld the facts. Yet the trial court dismissed those causes 
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of action based on Rule 9(b) URCP, finding there was "no alleged reliance, or action, or inaction, 
change of position based on what was allegedly conferred.11 Rec. 6136, p. 183. Plaintiffs are not 
required to allege reliance. If Plaintiffs are required to allege reliance, they clearly allege that they 
furnished funds because Defendants1 intentionally withheld material facts. Rec. 3174, f^ 85; 
3112,1f 258; 3086, % 318; 3069, % 359; 3044-3045, % 436; and 3932, If 487. 
Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint clearly identifies the persons with whom plaintiffs 
dealt, the occasions on which the misrepresentations were made and by whom the 
misrepresentations were made. Rec. 3177-3174; 3113-3110; 3092-3086; 3073-3069; 3048-3046; 
3033-3032; 3017-3014; 3011; 3005-3004; 2994; 2992; 2990; 2982; 2980; 2978-2970; 2968-2965; 
2962; 2950-2948; 2925-2911; 2909-2906. It also clearly describes the misrepresentations which 
Defendants made and material facts withheld, the time they made or omitted them, the content 
of the misrepresentations or omissions and what Defendants obtained by making 
misrepresentations. Id. Rule 9(b) URCP does not require Plaintiffs to include the exact words 
used or whether other parties were present, as the trial court required. 
For the purposes of finding if fraud was adequately pled, a trial court must consider the 
complaint as a whole. See Armed Forces Ins. Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^ f 18, 70 P.3d 35; 
Hall v. Romero, 685 P.2d 757, 761 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Parks v. Macro-Dynamics, 591 P.2d 1005, 
1008 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). In construing Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Tenth Circuit of Appeals stated ff]u]pon review of the entire complaint, we find that it met the 
requirements of Rule 9(b). While paragraphs 46 and 47 only parroted the requirements for fraud 
... earlier parts of the complaint stated the facts underlying the allegations of fraud." American 
Town Center v. Hall 83 Associates, 912 F.2d 104, 109 (6th Cir. 1990). Tht American Town Center 
court went on to hold that the complaint gave fair notice to the defendants of the substance of 
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the claims of misrepresentation. Id. at 110. 
Additionally, the trial court refused to consider the Second Amended Complaints a whole. 
It required Plaintiffs to include all relevant facts regarding the fraud-based claims in the various 
causes of action. The trial court stated, "there are circumstances where there were not references 
to earlier facts that were pleaded." Rec. 6136, p. 183. The trial court held that if all of the facts 
would have been restated in the specific causes of action, it would have satisfied the particularity 
requirement of Rule 9(b)URCP. Rec. 6136, p. 203. The trial court admits the relevant facts 
were contained in the Second Amended Complaint^ but it was fatal to the Second Amended Complaint 
that they were not all referred to or contained within each cause of action. Id. The trial court 
held that to plead fraud with particularity means Plaintiffs must plead all of the relevant facts in 
the specific causes of action or refer to them specifically in the causes of action. Id. 
Rule 9(b) URCP does not require all the facts to be stated or referred to within each 
cause of action. Defendants never presented any argument, reason or authority for such a 
proposition. Because the trial court must examine the Second Amended Complaints a whole, there 
is no need to engage in such redundancy. See Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison^ 2003 
UT 14, If 18, 70 P.3d 35. 
Even if the trial court correctly required all the important and relevant facts be alleged 
within the causes of action, Plaintiffs meet that standard. A review of all of Plaintiffs1 fraud 
based causes of action demonstrates that Plaintiffs either included or incorporated all of the 
important facts into the actual causes of action. The trial court committed error when it refused 
to consider the Second Amended Complaints a whole, when it required that all the facts relevant 
to each fraud based claim be included within each cause of action and when it concluded that 
Plaintiffs did not include the important facts in the causes of action. 
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The trial court stated that it dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud based claims after a "careful review 
of the memoranda and authorities submitted" by Defendants. Rec. 5605. However, Defendants 
provided argument, reason or authority only as to why Plaintiffs1 fraud claims in relation to the 
MagnetBank loan, the non-disclosure action in relation to the Double T Ranch Water Purchase 
and the fraud allegations in relation to the Presidio Land and Water Deal failed to meet the 
particularity requirement. Yet the trial court dismissed all of Plaintiffs1 fraud based claims. It 
is a fortiori that the trial court could not have dismissed all of Plaintiffs1 fraud based claims for 
lack of particularity based on the reasons given in Defendants* memoranda if they did not submit 
any argument, reason or authority as to why all of Plaintiffs' fraud claims failed to meet the 
particularity requirement. 
In its Ruling and Order on Defendants1 Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint^ the trial 
court likened Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint Xo the complaint at issue in Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 
UT App 339, 79 P.3d 974, concluding that the "Second Amended Complaint merely dumps 
upon the court the burden of sifting through hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain 
whether Plaintiffs have alleged the facts necessary to make all their elements of fraud." Rec. 
5605. However, Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint is very different from the complaint in 
Coroles, 
The Coroles court found the complaint suffered from several flaws. First, "the section of 
the complaint devoted to common law fraud consists of eleven paragraphs. The first of these 
paragraphs, paragraph 661 of the complaint, simply reads: 'the foregoing paragraphs numbered 
1-660 are incorporated into this Count.1 The remaining ten paragraphs of this section merely 
recite the elements of fraud and allege that Defendants committed each element" Id. at \ 25. 
The Coroles Court found "the mere recitation of the elements of fraud in a complaint does not 
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satisfy the particularity requirement." Id. at f 26. Importantly, the Coroles court found the 
paragraph incorporating all of the previous paragraphs was "equally unhelpful It essentially 
dumps upon the trial court, and now this court, the burden of sifting through hundreds of 
paragraphs of alleged facts to ascertain whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts necessary to make 
all their elements of fraud." Id.2X\Tl. 
Here, Plaintiffs have not merely incorporated all the previous paragraphs of the Second 
Amended Complaintinto their fraud causes of action, but have included references to the specific 
allegations contained in the general allegations sections of the Second Amended Complaint. Rec. 
3017-3014; 3011; 3005-3004; 2994; 2992; 2990; 2989; 2882; 2980; 2978-2970; 2968-2965; 2962; 
2950-2948; 2925-2911; 2909-2906. Further, the Second Amended Complaint contains discrete 
sections which set out the misrepresentations made, who made them, that they were false and 
why they are false. Rec. 3177-3176; 3113-3112; 3092-3089; 3073-3071; 3048-3047. The alleged 
fraudulent non-disclosures are likewise set forth in discrete paragraphs. Rec. 3176-3174; 3112-
3110; 3089-3086; 3071-3069; 3047-3046; 3033-3032. 
Another problem with the Coroles complaint was it used "the passive voice" and failed to 
identify "who made the alleged misrepresentations." Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, f^ 28, 
79 P.3d 974. Here, Plaintiffs used the active voice and identify who made the 
misrepresentations, when they made the misrepresentations and what the misrepresentations 
were. Rec. 3177-3174; 3113-3110; 3092-3086; 3073-3069; 3048-3046; 3033-3032; 3017-3014; 
3011; 3005-3004; 2994; 2992; 2990; 2982; 2980; 2978-2970; 2968-2965; 2962; 2950-2948; 2925-
2911; 2909-2906. Therefore, unlike Coroles, Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint docs not "dump 
on the trial court. . . the burden of sifting through hundreds of paragraphs of alleged facts ...." 
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Id. at T{ 27.4 For the above-mentioned reasons, Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint comports 
with the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) URCP and the trial court erred by dismissing 
Plaintiffs* fraud claims. 
II. Dolezsar Is Not a Necessary and Indispensable Party 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
i 
(a) Persons to be joined if feasible. A person who is subject to service of process 
and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the personfs 
absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) 
the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in the personfs absence may (i) as a practical 
matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave 
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. 
(b) Determination by court whenever joinder not feasible. If a person described 
in Subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine 
whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the 
parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus regarded 
as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what 
extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to the 
person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective 
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the 
prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the 
person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an 
adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 
In addressing an issue under Rule 19 URCP, a court must first determine whether a party is 
necessary under Rule 19(a) URCP. See Smith v. Osguthorpe, 2002 UT App 361, % 48, 58 P.3d 854. 
If the court concludes that a party is necessary under 9(a) URCP, it then must "consider whether 
joinder of the necessary party is feasible." Id. Rule 19 URCP is "substantively similar to its 
''This Court stated in Coroles, "whether a complaint is much too long and involved is, of 
course, dependent on the complexity of each individual case." Coroles v. Sabej, 2003 UT App 
339, n. 11, 79 P.3d 974. This matter concerns complex, multiple, inter-related frauds that 
occurred over a five year period. 
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federal counterpart" and federal case law may be used as guidance. See Seftelv. Capital City Bank, 
161 P.2d 941, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In finding Dolezsar is a necessary party, the trial court determined that "complete relief 
would not be available" to Defendants without Dolezsar as a party for reason of their inability 
to hold him accountable. Rec. 5593. The trial court's analysis was flawed because it disregarded 
established laws regarding agency. 
Plaintiffs allege that at all times Dolezsar was acting as Leslie's agent. Rec. 3016, ^ f 542; 
3001, f 601; 2978, f 718; 2945, f 864. "Under Utah law, the knowledge of an agent concerning 
the business he is transacting for his principal is to be imputed to his principal." Swan Creek 
Village Homeowners v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, f 27, 134 P.3d 1122. Therefore, when Defendants 
made misrepresentations to Dolezsar, it is if diey made them to Leslie. When a third person 
perpetrates a fraud upon an agent, either by misrepresentation or by silence, the fraud is 
considered as worked upon the principal. See 3 Am Jur 2d Agency § 287. In both its Rule 19 
URCP analysis and in its Rule 9(b) URCP analysis, the trial court focused on when, where and 
how the misrepresentations were repeated to Leslie. Rec. 6136, p. 183. However, such focus 
is misplaced. Under agency principals, when Defendants made misrepresentations to Dolezsar, 
a person whom Plaintiffs allege Defendants knew was acting as Leslie's agent, they made the 
representations to Leslie. It does not matter where the misrepresentations were repeated to 
Leslie, when the misrepresentations were repeated to Leslie, or even if they were repeated to 
Leslie. Further, Rule 19 does not require the joinder of principal and agent. See Nottingham v. 
General American Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir 1987). 
The trial court focused on the fact that Plaintiffs pled, in the alternative, that Dolezsar 
was part of conspiracy with the Defendants and therefore Dolezsar is a necessary party because 
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accountable.11 Rec. 5593. Such a holding ignores that Plaintiffs allege, in the alternative, that if 
Dolezsar was acting as par! nf .1 eonspiracy, Defendants authorized him tr make the 
allegation does not make Dolezsar a necessary party. Nor does it mean 'that Plaintiffs failed to 
plead fraud with particularity. In Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d 785 (Ut C t \ p p . 1987), 
this C01 if J: held th at ![a] j : r^s> :: 1 1 :ai inc t be I iabk for frai id 1 1 it: lless 1 le 1:1 iad> z th = false 
representations himself, authorised someone to make them for him or participated in "the 
misrepresentation in some other way, such as through a conspiracy." Wat 792 (emphasis added). 
l ) r . ' . < , , - i - . , . i . . . , s : 
misrepresematioM 10 Leslie as pari oi a conspiracy. Ret ^lli* 1111 ?S8-?S9; i()(P, M)91^; J i l, 
3048-3046,11^4 i i > -.- l,and ..V .,1( >eUmhuu>,trc liable 10 Plaintiffs because 
the] ai it! IOIT . •' •* t M UN -f.f
 f--'i' - • ,- '• ijas I'll1 , 
Dolezsar a necessan part), not dors 11 M \ i«» relieve Defendants from responsibility for their 
misrepresentations. 
The trial court, in c< t;. *MM -J:{ ;• -u - r. * • ne<. - u- . . j . : , i.,al'\ :!i : *-
heavi ly o n Turville v. ](&] Properties, L.C., 2006 U T A p p . ^ • 1 ^  P id I ' < • 1- Dorii/i, l ames 
R it< :h u : ("R ii * :hi< "' ) J< •!: . 1 Qi xil i< |i 1 ii ( 'Qi 1 i,l i< \\ ill '"  ) t n d Cl..:i 11 i. I >r< >f >erties, l.i IC. ( CI 1") .vhose 
officers were Mrs. and Mr. Clark, formed Tri-j Properties, LLC ("Tri I"'* *<>»• th- 'MUDOSC of 
buying 14.2 acres of real property from.. Davis County.. Tri J won. t he Iml < >n the property Mi: 
rather than Tri-J's. Mr. Clark later deeded the property back to Tri-J =n I v to subsequendy deed 
128 acres of the real property back to CPI Fourteen acres remained in Tri-Jfs nam< \ T >f T* 
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transfers were done without Ritchie's or Quitiquitfs consent. See Id. at If 2. 
Turville met with Ritchie, Quitiquit and Mr. Clark in hopes of purchasing the real 
property. Tri-Jfs members were undecided about selling the property. Unknown to the other 
members of Tri-J, Mr. Clark contacted Turville and told him that CPI owned the 128 acres, that 
he would sell the 128 acres and that he had authority to sell the 14 acres as well because he was 
manager of the 14 acre property. Turville then made an offer to Mr. Clark to purchase the 128 
acre parcel and the 14 acre parcel for $1,000,000.00. Mr. Clark caused CPI to deed the 128 acres 
to Turville. Mr. Clark also gave Turville a quitclaim deed for CPIfs interest in the 14 acres. Mr. 
Clark promised Turville that he could convince Tri-J to transfer the 14 acre property to him. 
Turville gave Mr. Clark a note for $1,000,000.00 and began developing the properties. See Id. 
at m 3-4. 
Mr. Clark was unable to convince the other members of Tri-J to deed the 14 acres to 
Turville. Tri-J refused to convey its interest without proper compensation, alleging that Turville 
had no legal right to the 14 acres because Mr. Clark had no legal authority to transfer the 
property. See Id. at \ 5. 
Tri-J and CPI sued Turville claiming he had obtained tide to the 128 acres and the 14 
acres by misrepresentation and without consideration. After the lawsuit was filed, Mr. Clark 
made a deal with Ritchie and Quitiquit under which they would receive $300,000.00 of the 
proceeds from the $1,000,00.00 note given to Mr. Clark. The lawsuit was then dismissed. See 
Id.at^l. 
Later, Turville filed a complaint against Tri-J, Ritchie, Quitiquit, J&J Properties, CPI, Mrs. 
Clark and Mr. Clark. Turville served Ritchie but took no further action. Turville filed for a 
default against Ritchie, which the trial court granted. Then Mr. Clark died of cancer. See Id. at 
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I I 8 9 I i irvi I le 1 1 len ser v ed 1 1 ic c .ompla inl : u I I ii J, J&J Qi lit iqi i il , CPI at: id IVirs. Clai k I h : 
never served Mr. Clark. CPI answered the complaint and filed a notice of suggestion of death, 
noting Mr. Clark had died. Ritchie (hen moved the < * mi* i< > se! aside the default against him, 
vi, 1: i ich w as latej : se t aside Qi lit iqi :i it, I ri J, R itchie and ]& J n io\ e d tc dismiss I I it: i i 1 le's 
complaint. See Id. at |^ 10. 
Turville filed a First Amended Complaint which added the Estate of Mr. Clark as a 
add additional parties, among them the Estate ui Mr. Clark. See Id. at *|| 13. I lie trial court 
denied Turville's Motion to Amend and struck Turvillefs First A mended Complaint See Id, at 
* ,; • i ' , . : • • • * - : » - - • ' J- , . i II I' " " ilisnnss ' ill \ ille*' {<.inpl,nnl I.)-" 
failure to loin the Estate of Mr (lark as an indispensable party. .See Id. at J^ 17. The trial court 
granted the motion io dismiss ilu. complaint tor iailun io
 :.>m and indispensable party. See Id. 
/ If 19. 
The I Jtah ( ]ou rt of Appeals upheld the iriai ( oun • dismissal lot lailure to n*ui ai, 
indispensable party, stating iu,r. i i su \u \ \ <>: ilu lecoid supported uu iriai court's conclusion 
*!:• lE-c'.- : •:; ! M r - • •: accorded among 
diose already parties to the acti< >n Id. at 1| -10 The court io;md n very important thai Tim iiu> s 
claims " specifica 1 1) i lamed or included I"1* it ( la.i :* • i i i i i,i> i i n i ivn u iai capacity .* •. :iu court 
referenced a case from the Federal District Court in Pennsylvania which stated "because plaintiff 
makes no claim against the unjoined party, it is clear that complete relief can be granted in its 
absence f I /. at I I ( ) I he c :>i J t 1 Ifi :i r ii ler state « 1, "Plai nt iffs i "easoi I for naming and niuuuing .-dr. 
Clark is apparent where the record reveals that it was primarily, if not solely, the actions of Mr. 
Clark in his individual capacity llial led to Plaintiffs alleged damages." Id. 
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The court found it was not possible to join Mr. Clark's estate, stating: 
[w]e further concur that because Plaintiff named or included Mr. Clark in his 
claims as the major, if not the sole, actor responsible for Plaintiffs alleged 
damages, fa judgment rendered in die Estate of Mr. Clark's absence would 
prejudice those already parties1 to the action; protective judgment provisions 
would not ameliorate this prejudice; a judgment entered in the Estate of Mr. 
Clark's absence would be less than adequate; and, most importantly, as a result of 
the foregoing factors, the nonjoinder of the Estate of Mr. Clark would violate 
principles of 'equity and good conscience.' 
Id.at%42. 
The court's finding that the Estate of Mr. Clark was a necessary party was based on the 
fact Turville had named him as party. See Id. at f^ 40. Further, the court quoted with approval 
a Federal District Court's holding that because a plaintiff made no claims against an unjoined 
party, it was clear that complete relief could be granted in the party's absence. Id. Here, 
Plaintiffs did not name Dolezsar. Therefore, according to the court's reasoning in Turville, 
Dolezsar is not a necessary party and complete relief may be granted in his absence. 
Further, Mr. Clark and Dolezsar played very different roles. Mr. Clark initiated and made 
misrepresentations directly to Turville. He did so for his own benefit. Here, the 
misrepresentations were initiated by Defendants and made to Dolezsar who was acting as 
Leslie's agent and managing her business affairs. When the misrepresentations were made to 
Dolezsar, they were made to Leslie. Dolezsar simply repeated Defendants' misrepresentations 
to Leslie. 
The Simpson Defendants, on the other hand, are most like Mr. Clark. They made the 
misrepresentations to Dolezsar and Leslie for their benefit. They knew the true facts but failed 
to disclose them to Dolezsar and Leslie. In Turville, the Court found that Mr. Clark was the 
major, if not sole actor, responsible for Turville's damages. See Id. at \ 42. Here, the Defendants 
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• a re tl le major actors ai id are respoi isible Ixii • I }h it itiffs' dan 1 age s not Dolezsar. 
The trial court concluded that Dolezsar, like Mr. Clark, occupied a "pivotal representative 
role." Rec. 5593. However, iinlike Mr Clark who initiated the misrepresentations and 
IJUITH filled lhcfcln\, I h»liv;s;ii" m< IN \\ icpcatid flu misivpn .< nlalions, hr did n< 1 initial* lil'i n 
The misrepresentations were made to Dolezsar, in his capacity as Leslie1 agent. Even if it was 
proper to focus on Dolezsar1 s repeating Defendants' misrepresentations, he did so on the 
Dolezsar to repeat the misrepresentations to I.eslie. 
I ?u rther, in determining Dolezsar occupied a "pivotal representative t < > iL . d 1 • i n al court 
amotion t o d i s r n ^ a trial conn mav not make factual determinations regarding allegations. .See 
Qsguthorpe v. U: oij Muuniain \\isut/.i. LA , , . . ! u h - t I /*>. *i l^K ' " 3d 9 9 9 . I n c o n s a k rm> <t \ -*iai 
::: :)i it: It's denia • •= • . ! avals stated, "fe"^*' • 
factual disputes al>< >ut [a partyfsj role in this matter, it is inappropriate for a trial court to resolve 
inoi-.c i actual uispuU;-. in the course of evaluating a mutior to amen*. ; 'uncock* i ••>• ut. 
Uving Church of Ictus Christ oj Saints t*t the IMSI l)>..- MM); I s > 
Because a trial cour t c a n n o t m a k e factual de te rmina t ions in cons ider ing a ni< *in >n to dismiss , the 
s ime i 'eason ing ; ipplies I lere , tl IC ti i: il igt 10.1 "ed PI; in it iffs1 ma in \ t! legal ions t hat Dolezsar was 
acting as Lesliefs agent and made a factual finding r<<yanlim> Dolezsar1 s role in the 
misrepresentations. This is error. 
In j ipplyingl I: le first; iiic h .ec oi i< If; id o,J :sof R I lk 19( 1 >) I IK CP 1 o< let en n inew he! iiei : or not 
Dolezsar was an indispensable party; the 'trial court held Defendants would be unfairly 
prejudiced by any judgment issued in the absence of Dolezsar and any judgment rendered 
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without Dolezsar would be inadequate because Defendants would not be able to bring a cross-
claim against him. However, the inability to bring a cross-claim against another party does not 
make that party indispensable under Rule 19 URCP. Where, as here, claims are expressly limited 
to a defendant's acts or omissions, when defendants can be held liable only for damages 
attributable to their own fault and when defendants can be held liable for damages only in 
proportion to their own fault, joinder is unnecessary. See Johnson v. Higley, 989 P.2d 61, 71-72 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1999). 
In Nottingham v. General American Communications Corp., 811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1987), the 
court stated, "it is well established that Rule 19 does not require the joinder of persons against 
whom [the parties] have a claim for contribution." Id. at 880. The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals stated, "prior to the 1966 amendments to Rule 19, co-conspirators were not 
indispensable parties and the 1966 amendments did not alter this established principle." Pasco 
International Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 501 n.10 (7th Cir. 1980). Therefore, even if 
Dolezsar relayed misrepresentations to Leslie as part of a conspiracy, he still is not an 
indispensable party. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated "the possibility that the 
defendant may have a claim for contribution or indemnity does not render an absentee 
indispensable. The right of contribution and indemnity should not therefore, be considered to 
cause inadequacy of the resulting judgment." Gardiner v. Virgin Islands Water <& Power Authority, 
145 F.3d 635, 641 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
Applying the last factor of Rule 19(b) URCP, the trial court concluded Plaintiffs would 
have an adequate remedy if their fraud claims were dismissed. The trial court found Plaintiffs1 
remaining claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and unjust 
enrichment constitute an adequate remedy for Plaintiffs. However, the trial court's analysis is 
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faulty I 'laintiffs arc left wit! 11 10 ren led) aga inst Defendai its w h o made misrepresentat ions to 
t h e m and wrongfully damaged them. 
O n e of the major considerat ions in applying the last 'factor is whether a plaintiff would 
• • ' . • ' . - • i ' . 7 / *'\ • ' » < / > / * ' v "' • » 7 / i ( . ; ' , ' . } t o w 
39U U.S. 102, 112 (1968). Here , there is n o o ther cour t in which Plaintiffs ma\ :>ri?v' *heir 
claims. 
I *la intiffs n: lade t he abc '> e a rgui nei its t ::: "1:1 le tria 1 • :• :)"i i r I: a t i ;:!. ti le J )eiei: idants ne \ e:t: 
contradicted 'the audiority cited by die Plaintiffs regarding joint tortfeasors, claims for 
contribution, co-conspirators and claims for indemnih Ye1 the trial nuifi ignored - H J 
entered in iht al >sence < >l Dolezsar would be inadequate because Defendant would not be able 
to make a cross-, Uini against Dolezsar. The case \A\\ \ learlv states that such a reason does not 
make *n ^ i ^ - ^ 
I n ProvidentTradesmens Bank (&Trust, the United States Supreme ('.ourt: add tc^cd ivuLPJ 
o-l iln I'cderal Rules ul 1 Jvil Procedure in detail li staiul ihai Rule 19(h) "suggests four 
'interests' 'that must be examined in c ach ::asc to detei mil le \x 1 let! lei • ir ,. equity ai K I gc :i :> ; 1 
conscience, the cour t should proceed wi thout a party" whose absence from the litigation is 
; is <in mierest i.i h.i. i;u-f .[ Mruj.i I k ' - . , il-. I t., 
the strength of this interest obviously depends u p o n whether a satisfactory a l tenur *\ * 
exists " Id. T h e trial cour t did ilot consider whe the r Plaintiffs would have an alternate forum. 
' I "1 le I *rvvident co\ i i i: foi md tl lat "i i it ider I .1 le Fe c le i 'al R i lies of Cr , il Procedure , on w:h ich the I Jtah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are pat terned, the considerat ion is centered o n whe T!»< * 
would have access to another court . Id. 
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In Provident, the court referred to the comments of the Advisory Committee on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which state, " [t]he court should consider whether there is any 
assurance that the plaintiff, if dismissed, could sue effectively in another forum where better 
joinder would be possible." Id. at n. 3. Plaintiffs have no other court in which they may bring 
their fraud claims. They are left without a remedy. The trial court, instead of looking at 
Plaintiffs1 interest in having a forum; found, without any analysis to support its statement, that 
Plaintiffs1 remaining claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion and 
unjust enrichment would suffice. There was no analysis or suggestion that Plaintiffs would have 
a forum in which to pursue their claims for fraud, fraudulent non-disclosure, conspiracy and 
UPUA claims. When this criteria is correctly applied, it weighs in favor of allowing Plaintiffs 
to proceed with their claims even in the absence of Dolezsar. 
The second interest addressed by the Provident court was the defendant's "wish to avoid 
multiple litigation or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability he shares with 
another." Id. at 110. It is clear, as set forth above, Defendants' inability to make a cross-claim 
against Dolezsar or his estate does not make Dolezsar an indispensable party. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in holding that Defendant's inability to make a cross-claim against Dolezsar 
makes him an indispensable party. 
The third interest considered by the Provident court was "the interest of the outsider 
whom it would have been desirable to join." Id. The court must consider "the extent to which 
the judgment may 'as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect' his interest in the 
subject matter." Here, because Dolezsar is deceased, this factor weighs in favor of allowing 
Plaintiffs to proceed. 
Lastly, a court must consider "the interest of the courts and the public in complete, 
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consistei it. and efficient settlei i: IC til -of < :< :»t it! " : >\ ersies " I" I ' I "I: le I *rovit ient co\ irt stated f[w ;|ei "c a< I 
the Rulc't, tiiird criterion, whether the judgment issued in die absence of the nonjoined person 
will be 'adequate,1 to refer to this public stake in settling disputes by wholes, whenever possible." 
hi M I  I I I |< n , lln Klill \ I nil I uil\ Minsidctcd tin Hle<l nil ii< i|uindcr on I )dnitlliiil . I'll'ii 
criterion \V!HM« pn>p<Tlv ii]>plicd weighs in favor of Plaintiffs. 
I I I . T H E T R I A L C O U R T I M P R O P E R L Y D I S M I S S E D P L A I N T I F F S C L A I M S 
WlTHOI IT I JEAVE TO AMEND 
In its Ruling and Order on Defendants1 Motions to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint^ the trial 
court held that Plaintiffs1 fraud based causes of action were dismissed without leave to amend 
Ha "JIIIO'I 1 In-- • , .-impM. - ' - i ' . - • - •. * «\ , . - r- . i. : .ti\- .i\ ^  nsmissea ^ a:: 
leave to amend. See Wight, bAackey ct aL v. Bankamerica Corf-. }\{) K3d 79, 91 (2nd Cir. 2000). 
Rule 15 TTRCP provides thai lease :'o ami nd "shall he freelv gi\en when justice s* > 
to have dieir claims fully adjudicated. This is especially true when die motion to amend is made 
well in advance of trial." Nune% v. Alhoy 2002 UT App. 2An, f 19, 53 P.3d 2. Furt her, "p ]rial 
and prejudicial factors. 1 rial courts are not required to htui ill dime factors to dem a motion 
to amend; a couti .* juling on a motion to ami tul * ,,-,i . .* pit ditalcu * -e. . mh one < >r i\vo of the 
particular factors. \ n d n lanj other factors, si ichasdela) /bad. fa itl I, or fi iti 1 it) ma) weigh against 
tl le trial court's allowing amendment." I Daniels v. Gamma West Brachy therapy, ULC, 2009 UT 66, 
H 58, 221 I ' 3d 256 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Plaintiffs did not make a moti( >n lo -(-w^d iln tnmpLtiiil l»n JIJNC in 111. oidei die Itml 
court specifically stated it dismissed Plaint I i i < \ raud based claims without leave to amend. Rec. 
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5603. Therefore, any motion to amend would have been futile. Moreover, the trial court abused 
its discretion because it did not apply any of the factors or give any reasons for dismissing the 
Second Amended CompJaintwithout leave to amend. Id. Plaintiffs are left to wonder why they were 
denied leave to amend. If the trial court had correcdy applied the factors, it would have had to 
grant Plaintiffs leave to amend their Second Amended Complaint. 
Because it is early in this matter, any motion to amend would have been timely. 
Amendment to cure the deficiencies found by the trial court certainly would have been justified. 
Further, because most of the Defendants have not yet filed an answer to the Second Amended 
Complaint^ amendment would not be prejudicial. There would be no delay if Plaintiffs were to 
amend and Plaintiffs have not demonstrated bad faith. The trial court specifically found that 
amendment would not be futile. Rec. 6136, p. 217. Plaintiffs have not had multiple 
opportunities to amend the complaint. The trial court recognized Plaintiffs could cure any 
perceived deficiencies in the pleading of fraud with an amended complaint, and therefore 
amendment would be justified and would not be futile. Id. The trial court stated: 
"[t]he Court did not dismiss the Complaint because ... there was a total lack of 
factual basis or something like that. The Court dismissed those sections that it 
did dismiss because they weren't properly pled. And I could see sitting down and 
pleading these in a different manner and then adding in a few more things and 
being able to survive a motion to dismiss...." 
Id. The trial court recognized that Plaintiffs could amend their complaint and thereby survive 
a motion to dismiss. Id. Instead of allowing Plaintiffs to amend, the trial court dismissed the 
fraud claims without leave to amend. By doing so it abused its discretion. 
IV. Utah Recognized Causes of Action for Aiding and Abetting. 
The trial court concluded that Utah does not recognize a cause of action for aiding and 
abetting breach of fiduciary duty, which is provided for in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
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() 8 / 6 R ec. 6136, p 18 1 I I< y\\ e\ ei ; t he : "I Ji : il: I Si if n •< n : i M : C< • n u : I I: I i s It i if >1 i< :il 1} recogni zed si ic h i; i, 
claim. In United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P .2d 880 (Utah 1994), the 
plaintiff alleged some of the defendant-; "induced, aided, and abetted [some of the other 
on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim against the defendants lor aidmg ana 
abetting breaches of fiduciary duty and because the claims were barred by the applic a hie '-camte 
• ::»!: ] imitations S < i " I / 88 1 885 ' II le I Ital I Si lprcn le ( lo\ u : 1: addressed tl ic a id ing ai id abetting 
breach of fiduciary duty claim and tin- application of the statute of limitations m ihat claim /.*/ 
It affirmed the trial court's dismissal oi IIIMM i Lum^ hading they were barred by liu appiu ;n>u 
statue ol limtlalior V. /,/ a1 M* HI 1 l tn \ rh i npoil.iiil f, unnte lliml (lie I ^ii'h Si iptx nu 
Court did not take the position thai Mich i chum did not exist in Utah, and did not affirm the 
trial coin, CR u oi ii nat ion that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for aiding and abetting breac:; 
M.I* • erefore, the cla it: i I tor a idii lg at id abettii lg breach ol: fkii ; :•*•. : • is 
necessarily valid in I Jtah. 
;. • .onUcs
 (*:\dbey, 2\)K).S * i <n y: \ - \ ;;.. ..:, - ^r: oj \ppea;> considered 
- i !-( -? -u r.o* .?.-.!;; i M . icnof fiduciary duty and did not explicitly find that 
such a cause ol action does not exist in I Mali In fact the "oun noted that if such a i aust of 
actioi I exists ii I I Ital i, tl: le plai i: itiff fa i led to pr jpei :;hP allege it S < ?• " I /. at t :i 20 IV lost re cend) , the 
Federal District Court for "the District of Utah determined that Utah state courts "would 
recognize such a cause of action." Farm Bureau I Jfe Ins, Co, ti American Nat: Ins. Co., 505 
I ' Si if >i ) 2d 11 78 1189 (D I Jl al I 200 ; ') .
 : , < 
In addition, numerous other state and federal courts have adopted a cause of action for 
aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, among them,, are Arizona, California, Colorado, 
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Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico Nevada and Oregon.5 
Further, Utah has adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 874. See D'Elia v. Rice 
Development, Inc., 2006 UT App 416, f 36,147 P.3d 515. According to Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 874, "[a] person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in committing a breach of trust is 
himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused." 
Restatement (Second) Torts § 874, comment c. Therefore, because Utah recognizes the 
applicability of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874, it also must recognize a cause of action 
for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.6 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court required that Plaintiffs include, repeat or refer to all the fraud allegations 
that are contained in the general allegations section of Plaintiffs1 Second Amended Complaint within 
5
 Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters and Cement Masons Local No. 395 tension 
Trust, 38 P.3d 12,23 (Ariz. 2002); Saunders v. SuperiorCourt, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 438,446 (Cal. 1994); 
Nelson v. Elway, 971 P.2d 245, 249-50 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998); Sanke v. Bechina, 576 N.E.2d 1212, 
218-19 (111. 1991); Kurkerv. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Mass. Ct. App. 1998); Herman v. Coastal 
Corp., 791 A.2d 238, 253 (N.J. 2002); GCM, Inc. v. Kj. Cent. Ufe Ins. Co., 947 P.2d 143, 147-48 
(N.M. 1997); Dow Chemical Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98,112-13 (Nev. 1998); Holmes v. Young, 885 
P.2d 305,308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994); Borsellino v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 477 F.3d 507 (7th Or. 
2007); Brown v. United Missouri Bank, N.A., 78 F.3d 382, 387 (8th Or. 1998)(Missouri law 
recognizes claim for inducing breach of fiduciary duty); Seismic Intern. Research Corp. v. South Ranch 
Oil Co., 793 F.2d 227, 232 (10th Or. 1986)(recognizing claim for inducement of breach of 
fiduciary duty); Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 11 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir. 1996)(Indiana law 
recognizes that non-fiduciary can be held liable for inducing other to breach fiduciary duties); 
Donovan v. Schmoutey, 592 F.Supp. 1361,1395-1396 (D.C. Nev. 1984)(same under Nevada law). 
Many of these courts have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876 for guidance. See 
Terrydalev. UquidatingTrust<&Barness, 611 F.Supp. 1006,1015-1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(adopting 
Restatement reformulation and citing numerous other courts which also adopted the cause of 
action). For a complete list of jurisdictions that had recognized causes of action for aiding and 
abetting as of 2002, see Dale v. ALA Acquisitions, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 694, n. 5 (S.D. Miss.). 
6Similar reasoning was set forth and adopted by the Colorado Court of Appeals. See 
Holmes v. Young, 885 P.2d 305, 308 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994). 
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the specific canst"*-, ml a< linn lot' Inuml TIK lual tuuil (,inn lnnlml thai even though IMaitiliiIs 
allege Defendants made misrepresentations to Dolezsar, knowing he was Leslie's agcn- tiat 
Plat!itif l: • uu i to allege when, where, and what it was Dolezsar relayed to Leslie. Howcwr, I rah 
law is clear tl lat \\ Iiei 1 the t: i lisrepresei ltatioi is were made tc Il )olezsar as i /eslie's agent, iney were 
made to her. Because tin trial •: <inn refused to consider die Second Amended Complaint as a whole 
?L\ K; \\YA cad focused on the specific fraud causes of action, and because it failed to recognize that 
Plai ntifl - ailcvv - )olezsa r\* asalw ays acting as I ,esl ie's agent, it erred in dism issingPla i..i itiffs' 
fraud claims. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to determine that Plaintiffs 
satisfied the particularity return mem **i kmi {)(h) I JR CP and reinstate all of Plaintiffs1 fraud 
claims. 
The trial *. < t\ir\ further misapplied the factors contained in Rule 19 URCP to determine 
. • ar is a necessary and mdispciu>ahie pnrtv. Viainhils allege Dolezsar was acting as I/eslie's 
agent. Therefore, lor thr nurn* ••><- .-I - m: « nmiu- • - \ 
Dolezsar relayed th< misrepresentations to * M. ' . n Vhc misrepresentations originated with 
'* ?: -. '.in:'- , - i ; . liieir at noir- in makm,- tlu misrepresentation" to T c^-k 
through her agent The trial court focused on Plan it ifIs1 allnnativc pleading dial I X ilc/s.ii w ,r, 
part of a conspiracy with Defendants. 
It fi :i rther foci lsed 01 1 Dolezsai " i :epeat it lg 1 1 le n i isrepresentation^ r<; I A\S1IC, ra\ I •* ; ;..,. i, he 
Defendants makmp the misrepresentations to Dolezsar. However, even if Dolezsar a as pan < »l 
a conspiracy \KV,\ ,-* u:i ulants, he is not a necessary and indispensable party because Defendants 
a re J iable tc * r •< .;'<••*.*;.* ' e) made, and ' they authorized Dolezsar to repeat 
to J Leslie, i 'he i rial court also made an impermissible determination of fact mnirdn ;;> )-•*< 
role u I t 1: le misrepresentations. The trial court failed to recognize that the inability *<> l^w- a 
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cross-claim against a joint tortfeasor is not grounds for finding a party is necessary and 
indispensable, and therefore the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs, fraud 
claims based on Rule 19 URCP. Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court to find 
the trial court abused its discretion in finding Dolezsar is a necessary and indispensable party, 
reverse the trial court's decision, and reinstate Plaintiffs1 fraud claims. 
The trial court failed to apply any of the applicable factors and therefore abused its 
discretion when it dismissed Plaintiffs1 fraud claims without leave to amend. Leave to amend 
is to be liberally granted. The trial court recognized it dismissed Plaintiffs' fraud claims for a 
procedural reason which could be remedied by amendment, yet, nevertheless, it dismissed the 
claims and specifically ruled Plaintiffs could not amend. By doing so, it abused its discretion. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court to find that the trial court abused its 
discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' fraud claims without leave to amend and grant Plaintiffs' leave 
to amend their Second Amended Complaint. 
Lastly, the trial court dismissed Plaintiffs' causes of action for aiding and abetting, finding 
Utah does not recognize them. Because the Restatement (Second) of Torts and the majority of 
jurisdictions recognize aiding and abetting causes of action, Utah should also recognize them. 
Plaintiffs therefore respectfully request this Court to find that Utah recognizes a cause of action 
for aiding and abetting and reinstate Plaintiffs' aiding and abetting causes of action. 
DATED this 22nd day of February, 2011. 
BAILEY & JENNINGS, LC 
Bart J. B^fey 
William T. Jennings 
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1840 North State St., Suite 200 
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86 North University Ave., Suite 430 
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233 South Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202 
Pleasant Grove, UT 84062 
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P.O. Box 460 
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Sail Lake City, UT 84111 
Steven R. Sumsion 
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